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VÉDELEMGAZDASÁG 
Rodrigo Guajardo1
Defense Capabilities Development 
and Defense Industry, 
U.S. Case Study
Védelmi képességfejlesztés és védelmi ipar, 
USA esettanulmány
New product development is a very complex process independent of the domain, 
and defense industry is not an exception, being an especially challenging process 
that involves interactions between industrial suppliers of goods and services with 
multiple government offices often trying to balance competing objectives. The big 
dilemma is: How governments acquire the equipment, goods, and services needed for 
their armed forces at a reasonable price, appropriate quality, and with a reasonable 
time frame? Complex weapon systems are developed by the Ministry of Defense 
(MoD) through the defense acquisition system, which must provide more affordable 
systems as a matter of national security. Yet the defense acquisition system is in 
a perpetual state of reform, the fact is there is no evidence of improved acquisition 
outcomes. In this research, U.S. MoD defense acquisition system will be analyzed 
and the reforms that had to be made to improve the current acquisition outcomes.
Keywords: acquisition process, capabilities development, systems engineering, new 
product development, defense industry
Az új eszközök fejlesztése, területtől függetlenül mindig nagyon komplex folyamatot 
jelent, természetesen a védelmi ipar sem kivétel ez alól, hiszen ez egy olyan kihí-
vásokkal teli ágazat, amely az ipari termékek és szolgáltatások beszállítói és a kor-
mányhivatalok közötti kapcsolatot foglalja magában, és gyakran az egymással ver-
sengő célkitűzések kiegyenlítésére van szükség. A nagy kérdés a következő: az egyes 
országok kormányai hogyan vásárolják meg a fegyveres erők számára szükséges 
felszereléseket, eszközöket és szolgáltatásokat elfogadható áron, megfelelő minő-
ségben és észszerű határidőn belül? A bonyolult fegyverrendszereket a Honvédelmi 
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Minisztérium a védelmi beszerzési rendszerén keresztül dolgozza ki, amely nemzet-
biztonsági szempontból megfizethetőbb rendszert kell, hogy biztosítson. Azonban 
a védelmi beszerzési rendszer jelenleg úgynevezett reformállapotban van, hiszen 
a javuló eredmények még váratnak magukra. Ebben a tanulmányban az Amerikai 
Védelmi Minisztérium beszerzési rendszerét elemezzük és azokat a megvalósításra 
váró reformokat, amelyek a jelenlegi beszerzési folyamat eredményeinek a javítá-
sához elengedhetetlenek.
Kulcsszavak: beszerzési folyamat, képességek fejlesztése, rendszerfejlesztés, új esz-
közök fejlesztése, védelmi ipar
Introduction
Decisions associated with how to balance the competing objectives of delivering 
new military equipment at a reasonable price, with the appropriate quality, and 
with a reasonable time frame are normally taken under an environment defined by 
high stakes, high accountability, and high uncertainty. New product development 
at a high level at the Ministry of Defense (MoD) is achieved through a complex 
defense acquisition system, with also many opportunities for improvement. Despite 
its limitations, the defense acquisition system is proved to be an effective way to 
produce weapons that have performed well in battle [1].
Military planning is loaded with uncertainties, which demands an in-depth analysis 
of the scenarios where our troops will operate and the threats to which they will be 
exposed and, of course, imaginative solutions (scenarios). Military planning should 
not focus only on determining the means necessary for a specific type of conflict or 
mission, but it should be much more general and aimed at obtaining capabilities that 
allow covering a broad spectrum from them. Now, it must take into consideration that 
to obtain the most accurate results, the most likely scenarios will have to be included 
and the most demanding operational environments. In military terms, capabilities 
are “the set of factors (systems of weapons, infrastructure, personnel and logistical 
support) settled on the basis of doctrinal principles and procedures, that they seek 
to achieve a certain military effect at a strategic, operational or tactical level to fulfil 
the assigned missions” [2]. That is to say, a military capability is not only a weapon 
or a weapon system, but also a set of factors, more or less critical, but all equally 
important for achieving the desired effect.
New military equipment or more complex weapon system development are 
developed by the MoD through the defense acquisition system, which must provide 
more affordable systems as a matter of national security. The defense acquisition 
system is perceived to be in a perpetual state of reform in many countries without any 
evidence of improved acquisition outcomes, but indeed the reality regarding product 
development process all around the world is not different from the defense situation.
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Global Performance Assessment for New Product Developments
Many new products’ development fails; the Product Development and Management 
Association (PDMA2) led an international comparative research and multi-industry 
performance analysis in 2012 and determined that approximately 39% of all new 
developments had failed to reach the market with a minimum level of failure, even 
more, the failure rates grew by over 54% in the case when the development of new 
products required high levels of innovation [3].
According to the studies carried out by the PDMA dating from 1990 and shown in 
Table 1, the failure rate for the development of new products would be around 40%, 
which is consistent with the empirical studies conducted by [4] that analyses studies 
and reports since 1977 to 2010 and that estimate a failure rate for new products of 
40%, thus demonstrating that the failure rate has been constant over time.
Table 1. 
History and results of comparative performance assessment study CPAS [Made by the author.]
N° Study Year Sample  (Bussiness Units) 
Fail Rate 
(%)
1st Study 1990 189 42
2nd Study 1995 383 41
3rd Study 2004 416 41
4th Study 2012 453 39
As can be seen in Figure 1 and analyzing data report from PDMA 2012, only 44% of 
the new products with moderate innovation met the development schedule on time 
and 49% of them met the initial budget restrictions. The situation is not better in 
relation with new products with radical innovation, only 29% of the new products 
with a high level of innovation met development on time and only 32% of them met 
the initial budget restrictions. These poor records of new product achievements are 
shared all across the world without any distinction of industry, revealing that product 
development tasks are highly difficult.
2 PDMA – U.S. organization created in 1976 that focuses on the unique set of integrated activities involved in the 
full lifecycle of product development and management, including innovation.
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Figure 1. 
Success rates for new product developments with different levels of innovation [Made by the author.]
U.S. Defense Performance Assessment for New Product Developments
The performance of the defense acquisition has been widely discussed at many points 
in U.S. history. Recent years are no exception, as exemplified by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office’s Report (GAO3) and the U.S. DoD’s4 Performance of the 
Defense Acquisition System Annual Report, both listing the system for major weapon 
buying as “high risk” for nearly a quarter of a century. Some U.S. congressmen had 
pointed to the enormous total cost growth since the start of each program in the 
portfolio, which can mean going back to the 1990s. Under Secretary Kendall annual 
metrics were preferred, which show improvement in relation with previous periods. 
3 GAO – Independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress. GAO examines how taxpayer dollars are 
spent and provides Congress and federal agencies with objective, reliable information to help the government 
save money and work more efficiently.
4 DoD – The Department of Defense (DoD, USDOD, or DOD) is an executive branch department of the federal 
government charged with coordinating and supervising all agencies and functions of the government concerned 
directly with national security and the United States Armed Forces.
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Recent studies by other researchers, presented at CSIS5 and the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Defense Acquisition Research forum [5], have particularly illuminated two 
metrics: cost and schedule growth.
For a performance metric of new product development within the U.S. DoD, the 
data contained in Table 13 of Appendix IV within the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office’s Report to Congressional Committees (GAO-18-360SP) entitled Weapon 
Systems Annual Assessment [6] is considered. An analysis of these data reveals that of 
86 programs in the portfolio of U.S. DoD’s major weapon acquisition programs 2017, 
only about 37% of these are in a condition equal to or less than the first full estimate 
of total acquisition cost. This seems to be on par with the global performance records 
of new products that observe a medium to a high level of innovation, presented in 
Figure 1.
Count Min Max Bin Width # Bins Mean Median
86 –89 1.566 50 34 90.44 7.40
Figure 2.
 Frequency histogram percent change in total acquisition costs from first full estimates  
[Made by the author.]
5 CSIS – U.S. Center for strategic and international studies. Established in Washington, D.C., CSIS is a bipartisan, 
nonprofit policy research organisation dedicated to providing strategic insights and policy solutions to help 
decision-makers chart a course toward a better world.
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To get a complete state of the results obtained in the development of new products 
in relation to costs, data must be evaluated beyond a simple one measure of the 
pass–fail test. Figure 2 shows the cost distribution of 86 programs as a histogram 
with the associated descriptive statistics. It should be noted that although a large 
number of programs are effectively in or under the estimated budget line (65 programs 
were under 100% of the budget in relation with the first full estimate), the total cost 
growth for those programs that failed may be very large, with at least seven projects 
that failed their target costs, compared to which they amounted nearly 300% or even 
more. Additionally, Table 2 shows the 2017 portfolio aggregate changes in research 
and development (R&D), and total acquisition costs, as well as average delays in 
delivering operational capability since the programs’ first full estimates.
Table 2. 
2017 portfolio aggregate changes in R&D, total acquisition costs, as well as average delays in delivering 
operational capability, since the programs’ first full estimates [Made by the author.]
Fiscal year 2018 - Dollars
Since first full estimate 
(baseline to December 2016)
Change in total research and development cost $ 103.1 billion48.9%
Change in total procurement cost $ 430.8 billion47.9%
Change in total other acquisition costs $ 2.9 billion26%
Change in total acquisition costs $ 536.8 billion47.9%
Average delay in delivering initial capabilities $ 27.4 months37.7%
According to U.S. DoD’s Performance of the Defense Acquisition System 2016 Annual 
Report [7], nearly 22 of the largest defense procurement programs have been cancelled 
between 1997 and 2015 before reaching the stage of production of significant quantities. 
Although it is not reasonable or expected that all research and development (R&D) 
projects reach the manufacturing stage, a defense procurement process with a high 
level of efficiency should be able to identify those projects destined to fail before 
using higher resources.
In order to have an insight into the impact on the costs of those cancelled 
programs, Table 3 provides the sunk costs of five cancelled development projects. 
This information was obtained from GAO-14-77 [8] and it can be seen that it is not 
uncommon for the U.S. MoD to spend several billions of dollars on development 
programs in pre-completion stages. The opportunity cost associated with sunk-cost 
products of possible cancellations is that these funds could be used elsewhere in the 
portfolio of development programs and thus increase the rate at which superior 
capacities are finally delivered to the armed forces and the end-user.
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Table 3. 
2017 portfolio aggregate changes in R&D, total acquisition costs, as well as average delays in delivering 
operational capability, since the programs’ first full estimates [Made by the author.]
Program Service Centract Termination Sunk Costs
Aerial Common Sensor Army lead, Navyparticipation 2006 $186 million
Comanche Helicopter Army 2004 $5.9 billion
Future Combat System Army
First partial termination in 
2009, final termination in 
2011
Estimated $20
billion
Transformational Satellite 
Communications System Air Force 2009
Estimated $2.9
billion
VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Navy 2009 $3.3 billion
Figure 3.
 Development duration of historical and recent programs [Made by the author.]
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Unwanted trends in defense procurement are not only limited to the issue of costs. 
A recent report from the National Research Council (NRC6) called Pre-Milestone A and 
Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and Benefits for Future Air 
Force Systems Acquisition [9], highlights that in an era where product development 
of commercial technologies has been reduced considerably, the development time 
of much of the major weapons systems has increased dramatically. Figure 3 shows 
the duration time of historical and more recent development programs, whose 
data was obtained from the NRC report 2008, from which it can be concluded 
that the development times required for the most recent programs double or even 
triple the development times of historical programs.
U.S. MoD Defense Acquisition Process and Recent Reforms
The Defense Acquisition System has its foundation in the country’s policy and public 
law. The development, acquisition, and operation of military systems are governed by 
a multitude of public laws, formal MoD directives, instructions and manuals, numerous 
Service and Component regulations, and many inter-service and international agreements. 
Managing the development and fielding of military systems requires three basic 
activities: technical management, business management, and contract management. 
In the U.S., systems engineering management is one of the main pillars and has to 
deal with the technical management component of MoD acquisition management of 
DAU7 (2000) [10]. Systems Engineering Management bridges these processes and must 
resolve the dichotomy of event-driven needs, event-driven technology development, 
and the calendar-driven budget throughout its whole life cycle.
In the U.S., the Defense Acquisition System is regulated by DoD instruction (DoDI) 
5000.02 Operation of Defense Acquisition System dated August 10, 2017. This regulation 
provides policies and principles that govern the defense procurement system and 
forms the basis for all U.S. DoD programs that include weapon systems, services and 
automated information systems (AIS), and also establishes a management framework for 
interpreting the user requirements and technological opportunities in stable, affordable 
and well-managed procurement programs. It also identifies the reports, regulations and 
other information requirements for each milestone and point of decision.
The U.S. DoD 5000 document series were revised in 2000 to make the process 
more flexible, enabling the delivery of advanced technology more rapidly and at 
reduced total ownership cost. The new process encourages multiple entry points, 
depending on the maturity of the fundamental technologies involved, and the use 
of evolutionary methods to define and develop systems. This encourages a tailored 
approach to acquisition and engineering management, but it does not alter the basic 
6 NRC – Organised by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of scien-
ce and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government.
7 DAU – Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is a corporate university of the United States Department of De-
fense offering “acquisition, technology, and logistics” (AT&L) training to military and federal civilian staff and 
federal contractors.
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logic of the underlying systems engineering process. Later on, 2015 brought one of 
the major changes in the revised acquisition system with an increased emphasis on 
systems engineering trade-offs made between capability requirements and life-cycle 
costs early in the acquisition process in order to ensure that realistic program baselines 
are established in such a way that associated life-cycle costs of a contemplated system 
are affordable within future budgets.
The changes from the previous version of DoDI 5000.02 2013 to DoDI 
5000.02 2015 [11], [12] are significant. DoDI 5000.02 2015 document sets “affordability” 
as one of the central themes and cites the early application of systems engineering 
assessments and trade-off analyses used together with a solid analysis of alternatives 
(AoA) as the model for reaching the desired outcomes. Concepts as “affordability”, 
“systems engineering”, “trade-off analyses” and “analysis of alternatives (AoA)” have 
been strongly incorporated since the revision of DoDI 5000.02 2015. In relation 
with “affordability”, the revised defense acquisition system requires that meaningful 
trade-offs between capability requirements and lifecycle costs be explored early and 
often in order to ensure that realistic program baselines are established in such a way 
that associated lifecycle costs will likely fit within future budgets; the new instruction 
signals the increased emphasis on the AoA by dedicating an entire enclosure to the topic 
(Enclosure 9 DoDI 5000.02 January 2015). Finally, trade-off analysis being part of the 
system engineering analysis has been added to the systems engineering enclosure of 
DoDI 5000.02 January 2015. Table 4 shows the topics added to the Systems Engineering 
Enclosure of DoDI 5000.02 January 2015 considering trade-off analysis a part of the 
system engineering process.
Topic DEC 2008  DoDI 5000.02 
JAN 2015  
DoDI 5000.02 
Development Planning Not available Included
Systems Engineering Trade-off Analyses Not available Included
Technical Risk and Opportunity Management Not available Included
Technical Performance Measures and Metrics Not available Included
Modelling and Simulation Not available Included
Manufacturing and Producibility Not available Included
Software Not available Included
Reliability and Maintainability Not available Included
Program Protection Not available Included
Insensitive Munitions Not available Included
Program Support Assessments Not available Included
Table 4. 
Topics added within the systems engineering enclosure of JAN 2015 DoDI 5000.02 [Made by the author.]
Conclusions
In this research, the defense industry dilemma was introduced concerning how to 
deliver new military equipment at a reasonable price, with appropriate quality, and 
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with a reasonable time frame under a constantly changing environment with high 
levels of uncertainty. New product development performance was evaluated with 
international studies not only for the global market but the military industry as well 
concluding that both shares similar performance under development with medium 
or high levels of innovation.
The U.S. official reports were analysed in order to visualise the performance of 
new weapons development programs inside U.S. DoD and how cost and time is still 
a big issue with the total cost of program portfolio growing by 48% in relation with the 
first full estimate baseline and with an average delay in delivering initial capabilities in 
nearly 38% of the programs. Additionally, in relation to the duration of historical and 
recent U.S. DoD programs, it could be concluded that recent programs in comparison 
with some historical programs have double or even triple development time.
Finally, we could appreciate the recent reforms made by the U.S. MoD in relation 
with U.S. DoD 5000 Instructions documents in order to improve the outcomes and 
performance of current programs, reinforcing and adding “affordability”, “systems 
engineering”, “trade-off analysis” and “analysis of alternatives (AOA)” activities and 
directives as a new enclosure, further strengthening its development process of 
new weapons systems in its main areas of technical management of development 
engineering, such as systems engineering, the use of analysis of alternatives (AoA) as 
a tool and trade-off analysis in earlier stages and in a greater number of milestones, 
as a way to strengthen the outputs of the new defense programs in relation to costs 
and time frames, given the changing prioratisation of operational requirements due 
to the fluctuating changes in the threat.
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